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On Terrorism: Reflections on Violence
and the Outlaw*
Ileana M. Porras'"
Scarcely a week goes by without at least one terrorist related
incident making the headlines. The subject of terrorism has, mean-
while, engendered a vast and growing expert literature. Much of
this vast body of literature is pragmatic in nature, in the sense that
the authors are concerned with developing policy proposals. They
present and analyze the problem of terrorism and then promote
what they think is the appropriate response to terrorists-a re-
sponse that often involves changing the legal framework. The bulk
of what I call "terrorism literature" is produced in the "West." For
the most part, it is written from the perspective of terrorism as a
threat to western liberal democracies. For purposes of this paper, I
have limited my inquiry to such literature and to terrorism as a
western phenomenon. I am interested in exploring the repetition of
rhetorical structures in terrorism literature and their reproduction
in media reports of terrorist incidents. The choice of focus was dic-
tated by the belief that terrorism is not just an objective "some-
thing" out there to be located with a telescope and examined with a
microscope, but that it is also, less obviously, a creation or by-prod-
uct of western liberal democracies; that it is intimately linked with
the self-image or self-understanding of western liberal democracies.
The claim that terrorism is a creation or by-product of western
liberal democracies should not be mistaken for the simple claim
that "terrorism does not exist" or that "it's all politics, and one
man's terrorist is another's freedom fighter." Rather, it is a claim
about the origin of the concept of terrorism. Not an origin that can
be pinpointed in time, but a continuing process of origination. It is a
claim about the complex function that terrorism has come to per-
form vis-a-vis western democracies. It is a claim about the way in
* © 1994 Ileana Porras.
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University of Leeds, 1981; M. Phil., University of Cambridge, 1983; J.D., Harvard
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which terrorism has come to be the thing against which liberal
western democracies define themselves; about the way it has come
to be the repository of everything that cannot be allowed to fit in-
side the self-image of democracy; about the way it has become the
"other" that threatens, that desires the annihilation of, the demo-
cratic "self," and against which democracies therefore strenuously
defend themselves. Exploring the rhetorical structures of terrorism
literature and media reports provides an alternative way to not only
understand the meaning and function of terrorism for liberal west-
ern democracies, but to evaluate our response to terrorism.
In reflecting on terrorism, I seek also to pursue a second inqui-
ry: Why are critical scholars writing about international law so
often drawn to themes of violence and the outsider? One obvious
response would be that we are simply pursuing the trajectory, first
traced out by Freud, of examining that which is suppressed. Here,
the image would be that international law understands itself to
banish violence, religious passion, the irrational, and the exot-
ic/erotic. The banished, however, being imperfectly suppressed, is
constantly threatening to re-enter and extinguish the realm of inter-
national law. International law is, from this perspective, engaged in
a perpetual struggle for predominance, just managing to hold at bay
its desiring (and desired) exiles. To focus on violence and the outsid-
er is thus a critical strategy which places international law on the
couch, in the hopes of healing it by making it acknowledge, and
come to terms with, its violent and passionate fantasies.
At a more prosaic level, another response might be that critical
scholars, like everybody else, are simply drawn to issues of violence
by the commonly held belief (and the surprisingly seductive notion)
that real law is that law which helps our societies maintain or es-
tablish order by restraining the chaotic passions otherwise mani-
fested as violence. Thus, at the national level, we ultimately believe
that "real law = criminal law" while at the international level we
conclude that "real international law = international law about
violence." Such a response is not as uninteresting as it might at
first seem. The interest of such a response lies in its connection to,
even perhaps its derivation from, our deeply held conviction that
violence at least is real-that violence matters. That the "real" oc-
curs, is discernible, identifiable, and recognizable at the moment
violence erupts. Violence, we say, is not just talk. Violence traverses
the body, leaving traces of its passage. If anything is real, it is the
pain of violence. If anything is real, it is the viscerality of death.
Violence makes us serious. We righteously condemn those who dis-
play a frivolous attitude to violence-to real violence on real bodies.
The "reality/violence," in its turn, elicits a real reaction (anger) and
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a real response (law and its correlative: legitimate violence). Forbid-
den 'Violence thus unleashes approved violence. In the face of vio-
lence, we have to act. We cannot simply stand by and watch dispas-
sionately. "People are getting killed out there!" If, as critical schol-
ars, we are drawn to write about violence in international law, then
it is because we recognize the seductiveness of this notion, and seek
to understand how this connection between violence and the real
drives the development and self-understanding of international law.
In focusing on terrorism, my purpose has not been simply to
demystify international law-to expose it for what it really is "once
and for all." Of all the categories or subdivisions of law, internation-
al law is surely the one least in need of de-mystification. In fact, the
history of the development of international law can be described as
a succession of re-mystifications, following each cyclical bout of
debunking to which it is ritually subjected.' Resilient as it is, inter-
national law has survived each de-mystifying challenge slightly
diminished, but victorious and ready to re-charge. International law
thus seems peculiarly immune to de-mystification as a strategy.
In my work, I approach international law as a cultural produc-
tion-our cultural production-and recognize within it, and through
it, our fascination, our obsession, with violence and the outsider. In
looking at terrorism, I have found that international law forges an
intimate and seemingly indissoluble connection between violence
and the outsider or outlaw. It is this connection, this link, that
appears to exist between violence and the outlaw and the produc-
tion of international law which I think useful to explore.
I. READING TERRORISM
In looking at the literature on terrorism, I have been struck by
the way a double project emerges. The terrorist is transformed
through the authors' rhetoric from an ordinary deviant into a fright-
ening, "foreign," barbaric beast at the same time that extra-normal
means are called for to fight terrorism. Since terrorists are never
imagined as anything other than terrifying, blood-thirsty barbari-
ans, ordinary law is understood to be deficient or insufficient to deal
with them. In the face of terrorism, extra-ordinary law, it seems, is
required. Terrorism literature emphasizes, through its choice of
metaphors, that the situation is one of "us" or "them." To survive,
1. I use the words de-mystification and re-mystification advisedly, to suggest
international law's persistent relationship to religion/mysticism and its rhetorical re-
liance on (mimicry of) religious narratives. See, e.g., David Kennedy, Images of Reli-
gion in International Legal Theory, in THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGION ON THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 137, 137-46 (Mark W. Janis ed., 1991).
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we must destroy them. To fail to destroy them is to destroy our-
selves.
A similar double project is apparent in the popular press and
the public statements of politicians and policy-makers. Here the
label "terrorist" or "terrorism" is attached to a person, group, or
activity at the very moment that a call to action is made. Those
wanting the government to take extra-ordinary measures against
abortion clinic demonstrators or environmental activists are likely
to adopt the terminology of terrorism.2 To label a person, group, or
activity "terrorist" serves not just as a shorthand description, nor
even simply as a statement of moral indignation, but primarily as a
call to action-a demand for elimination.
[Tlerrorism is the crassest antithesis to democracy. It is the at-
tempt to subjugate and pervert the will of the people and its elect-
ed leadership by a minute bunch of reckless people resorting to
terrifying threats and unbridled violence. They say they kill for the
cause. What is that cause? Liberty from oppression? Freedom from
want? Justice for a people? If that would be their cause, how could
they plot the extermination of another people, terrorize their own
kinsmen and stuff their war chests with oil money from Saudi Ara-
bia, to finance the assault against the regimes of these countries?
Their cause is killing. Their vocation is violence.
They are not the avant-garde of a popular upsurge, but a
fiendish fringe which worships violence and despises humanity.
They are part of an international demolition squad disguised
as freedom fighters, presented by perverted publicity as glamorous
guerrillas, idolized by a disoriented community of alienated ado-
lescents. They are the outlet for uncontrolled savage passions.'
2. Following the murder of Doctor David Gunn outside an abortion clinic in
Pensacola, Florida, pro-choice advocacy groups characterized the killing as 'domestic
terrorism" and called on the President "to have the FBI investigate the recent spate
of violence against abortion providers and to order federal marshals to guard women
and doctors at clinics targeted by protestors." U.S. Reaction to Murder: A Series of
Hues, Cries for Protection at Clinics, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 12, 1993, at Al. These
same groups are "seeking legislation to make it a federal crime to block access to an
abortion clinic." Id.
Ranchers who graze their livestock on public lands in AZ, CA and
NV are increasingly being targeted by "eco-terrorist" vandalism and threats,
Rep. James Hansen (R-UT) told a House panel 5/12 .... He was speaking
in support of his bill that would make it a felony to kill or harass livestock
on public lands, increasing possible penalties to five years in prison and a
$250,000 fine. (Jeff Barker, Arizona Republic, 5/13).
Ranchers: "Eco-Terrorists" Strike Public Land Grazers, GREENwIRE, May 14, 1992, at
1.
3. Gideon Rafael, Chairman's Opening Remarks, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM:
CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE 111, 111-12 (Benjamin Netanyahu ed., 1980) (remarks be-
fore Third Session of Jerusalem Conference on International Terrorism, July 3, 1979)
[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM].
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Some of the most frequently used mechanisms to transform the
terrorist into a creature quite distinct from us are nicely illustrated
by Gideon Rafael in the above passage. First comes the claim that
terrorism is the "antithesis of democracy"; both cannot therefore
concurrently exist. By necessity one threatens or extinguishes the
other. Since democracy is good, terrorism must be evil. Terrorism,
we are told, "subjugates and perverts"; these are images of domina-
tion and perversion. Terrorists are "reckless" and resort to "unbri-
dled violence." They are out of control. They "plot the extermination
of another people"; they are heartless, cruel, and extreme and seek
the total destruction of their "other," that is, "us." They "terrorize
their own kinsmen"; they do not even recognize family ties, the
most basic human allegiance. "A fiendish fringe which worships
violence and despises humanity"; they are devils, or devil worship-
ers, and outside the human family. "They are the outlet for uncon-
trolled savage passions"; they are everything that civilization was
created to suppress. They threaten us with falling back into our
primitive and savage past.
Although we, the readers, might be tempted by such an out-
pouring of invective to ask the author what prompted him to say
these things-to ask him what evidence he has in support of the
appropriateness of his language and his images-we are unlikely
actually to challenge him. Even if we think that he really is going a
bit far-exaggerating for the sake of dramatic effect-we will hesi-
tate to contradict him. One problem for the critic of "name calling"
as a form of argument is that the literature on terrorism is so full of
hyperbole, of hintings and suggestions, of drama and emotion, that
to criticize this instance is to take on the whole genre.
In a typical statement, for instance, the director of the CIA
develops both drama and pathos in his description of what terrorists
do:
In confronting the challenge of international terrorism, the
first step is to call things by their proper names, to see clearly and
say plainly who the terrorists are, what goals they seek, and which
governments support them. What the terrorist does is kill, maim,
kidnap and torture. His or her victims may be children in the
schoolroom, innocent travelers on airplanes, businessmen returning
home from work, political leaders .... They may be kidnapped and
held for ransom, maimed or simply blown to bits.4
4. William J. Casey, The International Linkages-What Do We Know?, in HY-
DRA OF CARNAGE: INTERNATIONAL LINKAGES OF TERRORISi-THE WITNESSES SPEAK 5
(Uri Ra'anan et al. eds., 1986) [hereinafter HYDRA OF CARNAGE]. It is interesting to
note the prominent absence of police or military personnel from this typical list of
terrorist victims. In a report to Congress, the Acting Coordinator for
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While it may seem amazing that the head of the CIA should be
able to reach such heights of pathos, it is indicative of the rhetoric
deployed by authors on terrorism. Although we may question the
description of what terrorists do (surely terrorists do other things
than "kill, maim, kidnap and torture"--sometimes they just blow up
pylons or rob banks or have parties) and we may wonder at the
insistence on "children in the schoolroom" (how many children in
the schoolroom have been victims of terrorism?), or wonder at the
surprising coincidence that businessmen are always attacked by
terrorists precisely as they are "returning home from work," we are
still left with a feeling of culpable cynicism. The pathos and the
drama are so pervasive that we cannot help but be moved and con-
vinced. To criticize the rhetoric is to be heartless. What matter if
only one child died in a schoolroom the victim of terrorism? Isn't
that enough? Instead of finding fault with those who truly care
about the innocents' dying, we should be out there doing something
about terrorism.
II. AN INTERLUDE FOR THE NORMATIVE BIND
The term [terrorism] is somewhat 'Humpty Dumpty'-any-
thing we choose it to be.5
Although it has become popular in the terrorism literature to
refer to "terrorism" as being Humpty Dumpty, this seems to be an
inaccurate way to think. Humpty Dumpty said that a word would
mean whatever he wanted it to mean. With "terrorism," on the
contrary, everyone means the same thing. What changes is not the
meaning of the word, but rather the groups and activities that each
person would include or exclude from the list. Everyone uses the
word "terrorism" to mean a kind of violence of which he or she does
not approve, and about which he or she wants something to be
done. The sense of the word always stays the same; it is the refer-
ents that change.
Counterterrorism specifies:
For purposes of [the definition of terrorism], the term "noncombatant" is
interpreted to include, in addition to civilians, military personnel who at the
time of the incident are unarmed and/or not on duty .... We also consider
as acts of terrorism attacks on military installations or on armed military
personnel when a state of military hostilities does not exist at the
site ....
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 1992, at v n.1 (1993) [herein-
after STATE DEP'T REPORT].
5. WILLIAM R. FARRELL, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO TERRORISM: IN
SEARCH OF AN EFFECTIVE STRATEGY 6 (1982).
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How the word terrorism came to be understood universally as
pejorative is an interesting question that I will not attempt to an-
swer here. It is important, however, to examine the implications of
the word terrorism's inevitably pejorative sense. To say anything
about terrorism or terrorists, it turns out, is to be caught in a nor-
mative bind; that is, I have only two choices available-for or
against. In terrorism discourse, if I am not explicitly against ter-
rorism then I am necessarily for it. There is no middle ground. No
ambivalent position is available. To not condemn terrorism is to
condone it,' and to condone terrorism is to be morally as bad as a
terrorist.7 Indeed, to publicly sympathize with terrorism may itself
become a terrorist offence.' Thus, I find that there is really only
one legitimate position that I may hold vis-a-vis terrorism and ter-
rorists-I must think terrorism a great evil. This is so even though,
or especially because, "[tihe term has no precise and completely ac-
cepted definition... [because] the United Nations, has been unable
to agree on a definition of the term,"9 and "[no one definition of
terrorism has gained universal acceptance. " "
6. Moderate environmental groups have been urged to "police" the entire envi-
ronmental movement.
These ecoterrorists are a tiny, fringe group. They in no way represent
America's broad environmental movement.... [B]y failing to denounce loud-
ly and openly the ecoterrorists, mainstream environmentalists risk bringing
their entire movement into disrepute.
HERITAGE FOUND., Eco-TERRORISM: THE DANGEROUS FRINGE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL
MOVEMENT (Apr. 12, 1990).
7. "Terrorism... a moral evil, infecting not only those who commit such
crimes, but those who, out of malice, ignorance, or simple refusal to think, counte-
nance them." Benjamin Netanyahu, Preface, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, supra note
3, at 1-2.
8. See, e.g., Ley Organica 9/1984, de 26 de Diciembre, Contra la Actuacion de
Bandas Armadas y Elementos Terroristas, reprinted in CODIGO PENAL § 8 (1989).
The present Law is applicable to persons belonging to armed bands or
bands associated with terrorist or rebel activities who plan, organize or
perpetrate offenses listed in the following paragraph, and to those who col-
laborate in them or incite participation in the same, or conceal those impli-
cated. It is also applicable to those who publicly support such offenses.
(Author's translation.)
Id. art. 1.1; see also, 28 STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] § 130a, reprinted in THE AMIERI-
CAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES (1987). In response to the activities of the
Baader-Meinhof Faction, the Penal Code of the Federal Republic of Germany was
modified to criminalize the dissemination, public display, or otherwise rendering
accessible of a writing which contained support of one of the offenses enumerated in
article 126(1) (dealing with "terrorist associations"), or who set up, referred to, fur-
nished, held in possession, offered, advertised, commended, exported, or imported
such writings, etc. Id.
9. FARRELL, supra note 5, at 6-7.
10. STATE DEP'T REPORT, supra note 4, at v.
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The normative bind is not easily escaped. I may seek to avoid
the problem by saying, for example, that "Euskadi ta
Askatasuna"1 ("ETA"), in Spain, is a resistance movement whose
political purpose is the establishment of a Basque homeland. Al-
though I have not used the word terrorism, I cannot escape it. I am
immediately faced with two problems. The first is that because the
words terrorism/ terrorist are commonly used to refer to ETA, it will
be assumed that my choice of referring to ETA as a "resistance
movement" is a pro-ETA statement condoning ETA's activities12
(although I intended no such thing). The second is that since ETA is
officially declared a terrorist organization, I could be making myself
liable to prosecution as a terrorist sympathizer, even if I condemn
their acts, but in good faith, would not include ETA in my list of
terrorists. The power of the terms terrorism and terrorist thus reach
out well beyond their immediately apparent borders. In other
words, even though it seems each of us is free to establish the con-
tent or reference of the terms, their pejorative sense constrains us
at all times, imposing meanings not necessarily intended.
III. AFTER THE INTERLUDE: TECHNIQUES FOR TRANSFORMING
THE TERRORIST INTO AN OTHER
A. Transformation Through Violence
The U.S. contends that [Mahmud Abouhalima] is the epitome of
the modern terrorist, a self-made commando pursuing a homemade
agenda to disrupt Western civilization. 3
Terrorism literature and media reports are replete with state-
ments about the threat terrorists and terrorism pose to civilization
and democracy. The question of how exactly this threat is posed,
however, is rarely explored. The seriousness of the threat is instead
suggested by various means. One popular mechanism is through the
development of frightening metaphors whose relevance or aptness
11. "Euskadi ta Askatasuna" translates as Freedom for the Basque Homeland.
12. Germany's response to terrorist activities provides a similar example. Wheth-
er to refer to the Baader-Meinhof terrorists as constituting a group ("gruppe") or
gang ("bande") became itself a contentious issue during the seventies, the former
being thought by some to accord the terrorists too much unwarranted political legiti-
macy, the latter more appropriately placing them on par with ordinary criminals.
Indeed, then Minister President Bernard Vogel was heard to suggest that anyone
employing the nomenclature "gruppe" would be assumed sympathetic to terrorists.
DARIA M. KRISTICH, WEST GERMANY'S RESPONSES TO TERRORISM DURING THE 1970's;
Irene Dische, Germany's Terrorist Lexicon, THE NATION, Nov. 19, 1977, at 524.
13. Richard Behar, The Secret Life of Mahmud the Red, TIME, Oct. 4, 1993, at
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are rarely, if ever, explained. A good example of the use of a meta-
phor to create a powerful image, which will color our subsequent
thinking about the subject of terrorism, is the title of the book Hy-
dra of Carnage.4 Following the Title Page, but preceding the Table
of Contents, appears a page with the following inscription:
HYDRA
A serpent or monster slain by Hercules. It had nine heads, any of
which, when cut off, was succeeded by two others, unless the wound
was cauterized.5
The metaphor of terrorism as a Hydra is not developed in the
book, which is a collection of articles by various authors who could
be described as "hawks." The editors' choice of emphasis in their
definition of this mythological creature provides a clear indication
that the focus of the book will be on what should be done to "cauter-
ize" terrorism."6 The image of a "Hydra" conjures up quite effec-
tively the idea that the thing to be feared is a monster, that it is
hard to deal with this monster, but it can be overcome, and that
unless action is taken the thing will grow uncontrollably. Moreover,
by describing terrorism as a Hydra "of Carnage," the editors effec-
tively convey a sense of the countless mangled bodies that terrorism
leaves in its wake.
Another popular metaphor used to describe terrorism, and its
effect on society and civilization, is that of terrorism as a disease.
This can take many forms. From William Casey's passing reference
to terrorism as "this dreadful scourge," 7 to the extended "cancer"
metaphor of Paul Johnson in his The Cancer of Terrorism:
Terrorism is the cancer of the modern world. No state is im-
mune to it. It is a dynamic organism which attacks the healthy
flesh of the surrounding society. It has the essential hallmark of
malignant cancer: unless treated, and treated drastically, its
growth is inexorable, until it poisons and engulfs the society on
which it feeds and drags it down to destruction. 8
14. HYDRA OF CARNAGE, supra note 4, at ii.
15. Id. at iii (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DIcTIONARY 404 (12th ed.
1961)).
16. The metaphor, here as elsewhere, is faulty. Cauterization usually is a term
of healing-you have to stop the wound from bleeding or else the patient will die.
Here the underlying idea is that the Hydra herself must be stopped-the Hydra is
not the patient but the illness.
17. Casey, supra note 4, at 5.
18. Paul Johnson, The Cancer of Terrorism, in TERRORISM: How THE WEST CAN
WIN 31, 31 (Benjamin Netanyahu ed., 1986).
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The image remains the same, terrorism like disease is some-
thing we have to put a stop to.19 Although Johnson develops his
metaphor, using it to its fullest rhetorical extent, he does not ex-
plore the implications. It is as if the body is healthy but for the can-
cer. Western democracy is hunky dory but for terrorism. The meta-
phor of terrorism as a disease seems to call for a discussion of soci-
ety as sick, or in poor health, or needing a change of air, or needing
some new blood. It seems to beg the question of what caused the
disease. Instead, we find the focus is inevitably on eliminating the
symptoms of the disease." Although the relevance or aptness of
these metaphors is not explained, they serve to heighten the sense
of terrorism's distinctively alien nature and render the very exis-
tence of terrorists threatening.2' Monsters and diseases must be
eliminated because, regardless of whether or not they are actively
harming us, their destructive power is latent within them, ready to
19. Referring to the often criticized legal response of the United Kingdom to
terrorism, one author states approvingly: "It has been suggested that other countries
would not hesitate to enact laws even more stringent than those of Northern Ireland
if they were faced with a comparable plague of terrorist violence and murder." Wil-
liam R. Nelson, New Developments in Terrorist Trials in Northern Ireland, in THE
IRISH TERRORISM EXPERIENCE 155, 166 (Yonah Alexander & Alan O'Day eds., 1991)
[hereinafter IRISH TERRORISM]. A recent example of a similar use is that of the Turk-
ish Prime Minister, Tansu Ciller, who, following a series of attacks on Turkish tar-
gets by Kurd separatists, referred to the attacks as a "terrorist plague." Stephen
Kinzer, Anti-Turkey Kurdish Separatists Blamed for Attacks Across Europe, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 5, 1993, at A6.
20. The theme of terrorism as a disease appears to have been particularly popu-
lar at the Jerusalem Conference on International Terrorism, held under the auspices
of the Jonathan Institute, July 2-5, 1975. Papers and speeches presented at this
conference were collected by Benjamin Netanyahu. See INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM,
supra note 3.
This theme was then pursued by various contributors. Benjamin Netanyahu
stated that "[ilt is evident that in their struggle with the terrorists, the attacked
nations must admit to failure-that is, if their purpose was to arrest the tide of
terrorism in the world and place the malady under control." Benjamin Netanyahu,
The Face of Terrorism, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, supra note 3, at 4. Gideon
Rafael went on to say that "[tihe malignancy of terrorism not only accounts for grow-
ing numbers of victims, slain and maimed men, women and children whose only
offence was to travel in commercial airliners, blown up in midair, or to live in
peaceful villages and be massacred in their sleep." Gideon Rafael, The Threat of
Terrorism to Democratic Societies, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, supra note 3, at
112-13. This '"epidemic insanity' . . . is spreading. It must be checked by worldwide
quarantine measures." Id. at 113.
21. Another version of the metaphor of terrorism as a disease is that of terror-
ism as a virus which threatens to spread its contagion. In an article introducing
their latest collection devoted to Irish terrorism, for instance, two frequent contribu-
tors to the literature state: "[It remains speculation whether the terrorist virus will
spread." Yonah Alexander & Alan O'Day, Introduction: Dimensions of Irish Terrorism,
in IRISH TERRORISM, supra note 19, at 1.
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be unleashed. It is in their nature to destroy.
The threat terrorism poses to civilization passes through vio-
lence. A recurring problem for authors on terrorism is the need to
distinguish terrorist violence from other kinds of violence. The ter-
rorist should not be said to be using run-of-the-mill kinds of vio-
lence, the everyday kind of violence that affects the citizens of our
democracies in a matter of fact way-the violence that we have
come to live with. If the violence of terrorism is not distinguishable,
then the average terrorist may not seem much worse (if not any
better) than the average rapist, murderer, robber, or vandal.
A relentless emphasis on the almost metaphysical "innocence"
of the terrorist victim is one powerful mechanism that makes ter-
rorist violence different. Indeed, terrorism is often defined in rela-
tion to the "innocence" of its victims.22 Victims of common crimi-
nals may be innocent, although we are often quick to blame them:
the rape victim was asking for it-she was too seductive; the mur-
der victim probably deserved it-he was a bad lot; and the robbery
victim was careless-he didn't take sufficient precautionary mea-
sures. Terrorist victims are, on the contrary, doubly innocent. They
are inherently innocent (not to blame as victims), but they are also
innocent because they are in some sense sacrificed and sacrificial
victims. Sacrificed by the terrorists because they stood for the
things the terrorists despise. Sacrificial in that if our governments
had taken strong action against terrorists, as they should have,
these innocent people would not have been victims. While rhetori-
cally, crime often confers guilt on its victims, terrorism always con-
fers innocence. Emphasizing the tragic innocence of terrorist victims
serves to distinguish the outrageous and intolerable violence of
terrorism from mundane, everyday violence. Highlighting the spe-
cial innocence of terrorist victims also serves to heighten the urgen-
cy of the call to action, since the government, through its inaction,
is implicated in the innocent victims' death or suffering.
Another effective device for creating a distinction between ter-
rorist violence and other forms of violence is that used by James
Poland in Understanding Terrorism.' After defining terrorism,24
and presenting various typologies of terrorists, Poland creates a
22. One author defined terrorism as "the premeditated, deliberate, systematic
murder, mayhem and threatening of the innocent to create fear and intimidation in
order to gain a political or tactical advantage, usually to influence an audience."
JAMES M. POLAND, UNDERSTANDING TERRORISM: GROUPS, STRATEGIES AND RESPONSES
11 (1988).
23. See id.
24. Id. at 16.
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subheading "Terrorist Atrocities." Under this subheading, he refers
to authors who have discussed "the varying degrees of extranormal
violence used by terrorist guerrillas or revolutionaries."25 We can-
not help but wonder at this point what he means by "extranormal"
violence. Does he mean then that there is a category of "normal"
violence? And, how did extranormal violence come to be worse than
normal violence?
Law enforcement authorities are concerned that terrorists will go
"nuclear." The mystery and threat surrounding anything nuclear
makes it an effective source of terrorists fear and manipulation.
This extranormal dimension can also be illustrated in other acts of
violence such as shooting innocent travelers, shooting a teacher in
the presence of the teacher's students, cutting off an ear or finger
to dramatize the extortionist/kidnapper's demands, "kneecapping"
or shooting the legs of the victims to cause permanent disability.2
Poland then adds: "[Tierroristic atrocities serve several essential
objectives for the terrorist. First and foremost, they can produce
pure terror or paralyzing fear."27 As our imagination leaps off to
seek what kind of violence would be capable of producing "pure
terror" or "paralysing fear," Poland brings us down to earth by pro-
viding an example: the "systematic assassination of police officers"
in the "revolutionary film" the Battle of Algiers." Although he does
claim that the atrocities are most effective when directed at specific
critical groups (i.e., law enforcement), we are still surprised by his
choice of example. What happened to the pathos, the hyperbole, to
which we had already grown accustomed by this point in the text?
Where are the maimed babies, the tortured mothers? The targets of
this terrorist violence are police officers. The violence perpetrated
against the police officers is that of straightforward assassina-
tion-hardly the first thing that comes to mind with the word
"atrocity," especially after the vivid description of kneecapping or
cutting off fingers. Even more problematic for anyone who has seen
the movie, is that the Battle of Algiers vividly portrays the
terroristic nature of the French counter-terrorism measures. The
25. Id. at 16-17 (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 17. The "nuclear threat" posed by terrorists is itself an interesting
theme well worth exploring. There have not, to date, been any incidents of terrorists
going nuclear, and yet the nuclear terrorism literature has mushroomed. Even in
legislation we find that "terrorist activity" is defined specifically to include the use of
a nuclear weapon or device. See Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 414,
66 Stat. 182 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(B)(ii)(V)(a) (Supp. IV
1992)).
27. POLAND, supra note 22, at 17 (emphasis added).
28. See id.
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depiction of the systematic use of torture by the government,
against the suspected terrorists, makes it difficult to think of "atroc-
ity" as an attribute specific to terrorist violence. Building on his
example from the movie, Poland proceeds to describe two real-life
examples of "extranormal violence" or "terroristic atrocities": the
"indiscriminate killing of police officers from ambush" by the IRA in
Northern Ireland and by the Black Liberation Army in the United
States. Thus ends the subheading on "terrorist atrocities."29 Al-
though Poland's incapacity to depict pure terror or paralysing fear
convincingly is puzzling, the claim that terrorist violence is
extranormal continues to ring true.
B. Transformation Through Links to Traditional Enemies,
Foreign Ideologies, and Pre-Rational Beliefs
Until recently, before the much vaunted end of the cold war, a
popular mechanism used to transform the terrorist into a frighten-
ing enemy "other" was the implication that he was directly related
to the Soviet Union, to communism, or to both. The connection be-
tween the Soviet Union, communism, and terrorism was sometimes
made explicitly and dramatically, while at other times it was only
subtly suggested. All terrorist trails at the time of the cold war, it
seems, led to Moscow. The force of the "otherness"-creating power of
"communism" cannot be overestimated. The saying "better dead
than red," though it has lost some of its currency, does capture the
very real fear that communism, even today, evokes in many western
minds. In some western liberal democracies, the effect of labelling
someone a "communist" may still be almost as harmful as labelling
that person a "terrorist." Both, for instance, are excludable under
the United States Immigration and Nationality Act."
The linking of terrorism to communism served many evident
purposes. First, the threat posed by each "ism" individually was
greatly enhanced by its association with the other. Thus a terrorist
seemed more threatening if he was also a communist. His political
objective was made both more coherent and more credible by such
an association-more coherent because it could then be understood
as part of a carefully worked out, powerful, and effective political
philosophy, and more credible because of the material and logistic
support that became presumptively available. At the same time, the
demonization of communism was enhanced. As the credibility of the
Soviet threat was waning, as the picture of a uni-dimensional evil
29. Id.
30. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B), (D) (Supp. IV 1992).
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Soviet Union was being displaced by an almost human representa-
tion, full of ambivalence, the connection still drawn between terror-
ism and communism helped reclaim some of the lost territory.3'
The invocation of horrific images of terrorist atrocities, of the total
moral degeneracy of the terrorist, powerfully reinvested the Soviet
Union and communism with evil. It helped discredit the still-com-
munist Mikhail Gorbachev's claim of wanting good relations with
the United States and other western liberal democracies. From the
point of view of objectifying the terrorist, the foremost advantage of
using the technique of imaginatively linking terrorism and commu-
nism was that it provided a ready made, and easily assimilable, way
of both characterizing and explaining terrorism. To the question
"why do terrorists do what they do?" a sufficient answer became
"because they are communists." The heuristic use of communism
eliminated the need to analyze the phenomenon further.
Another link, that between communism and the "religious fa-
natics" or terrorists of the Middle East, also frequently appeared in
terrorism literature before the end of the cold war.32 The "crazy
states," Syria and Lybia, were often described as either Soviet influ-
enced or Soviet puppets. This link between the East (Soviet commu-
nism) and the religious fanatics of the Middle East should come as
no surprise. Like Turkey (the Ottoman Empire), Russia (the Soviet
Union) has only ever had a precarious toe-hold on western Europe-
an identity. Both Russia (the Soviet Union) and Turkey (the Otto-
man Empire) are better understood as part of the global (Islamic or
Orthodox) East against which the West has defined itself. The pro-
pensity of Russians for mystical religious excess is part of our cul-
turally shared understanding of them, an image not very different
from western images of Islamic excess. While Soviet communism
31. This is not to suggest, of course, that had the Soviet Union remained as
threatening and imaginatively frightening as it had been in its hey-day, less empha-
sis would have been placed on the Soviet-terrorist connection. On the contrary, it
seems that there is no limit to the desire to paint the enemy as ugly as possible.
There is seemingly no end to the benefits to be gained from having a clear, distinc-
tive, and powerful enemy with which to contend.
32. Addressing this issue, Benjamin Netanyahu has stated:
This collaboration between Marxist and Muslim radicals is not accidental.
Modern terrorism has its roots in two movements that have assumed inter-
national prominence in the second half of the 20th century, Communist
totalitarianism and Islamic (and Arab) radicalism. These forces have given
terrorism its ideological impetus and much of its material support. Both
legitimize unbridled violence in the name of a higher cause, both are pro-
foundly hostile to democracy, and both have found in terrorism an ideal
weapon for waging war against democracy.
Benjamin Netanyahu, Terrorism: How the West Can Win, TIME, Apr. 16, 1986, at 48.
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was criticized by the West for its suppression of religious expres-
sion, the Soviets were imagined to have a correlative propensity for
ideological excess. Communism had taken the place of mysticism,
yet the West's attribution of excess remained the same.
Following the collapse of communism, it was to be expected
that the West would look for a re-emergence of religious mysticism
in the ex-Soviet Republics.' The numerous reports of a chaotic,
uncontrolled return to faith in the former Soviet Union confirm our
western instinct, producing new themes for our continued othering
of these perpetual "Easterners." Furthermore, as the Soviet empire
has come loose, the West has rediscovered the large pockets of Mus-
lims contained within the "evil empire's" now fragmented borders.
This discovery has made the West nervous because it cannot help
but imagine a terroristic outcome to this welding of the two Eastern
identities.34
The theme of the close relationship between religious fanati-
cism and terrorism has also, independently, become an important
method of establishing the difference between them and us. Fanati-
cism is not something we ever attribute to ourselves. We are patri-
otic-they are fanatical. To be a fanatic is to be pre-rational. It is to
be almost, if not totally, insane. It is a dangerous thing which warps
the mind. To be a fanatic is to be incapable of heroism. To go on a
suicide mission, if you are a religious fanatic, is to be crazy and
deluded-not heroic. Crazy and deluded people are frightening.
They are capable of anything. We have to do something about them.
It is that kind of people who would be capable of dropping a nuclear
bomb. Like communism, religious fanaticism serves the heuristic
function of explaining terrorism.
The terrorist is always the "enemy." The trick is to locate him
in the category of the most terrifying traditional enemy-that one
which the public is accustomed to think of as the barbarous and
primitive outsider. The enemy of legend and history books. The
bloodthirsty invader of our collective imagination and individual
nightmares. The moslem moorish turkish invader of Europe dark
mysterious turban wearing merciless scimitar wielding head cutting
33. See, e.g., Malcom Gray, Kiev's Cult of the Doom, Near.Hysteria Grips Devo.
tees as They Await the End of the World, MACLEAN'S, Nov. 22, 1993, at 32; Larry B.
Stammer, Study Points to Religious Revival in Russia, LA. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1993, at
B5.
34. See, e.g., Raymond Bonner, Playing Dominoes in Central Asia, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 7, 1993, at D4; Thomas L. Friedman, U.S. to Counter Iran in Central Asia,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1992, at A3; Tom Hundley, Islam Surges as Communism Re-
cedes, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 1, 1992, at Cl; Gilliam Tett, Soviet Mullahs Who Threaten
Gorbachev, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1991, at 1.
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harem keeping mosque going minaret prayer chanting magician
christian hating jerusalem prophanator holy war maker of the past
has made a remarkable comeback.
Images of "Islamic fundamentalists" as terrorist fanatics who
have infiltrated our country in order to organize secret conspiracies
of destruction and terror, have come to dominate the public imagi-
nation in the United States. So closely have the ideas of terrorism
and Islamic fundamentalism come to be connected, that the U.S.
State Department in its Patterns of Global Terrorism 1992, issues
the following disclaimer:
Adverse mention in this report of individual members of any politi-
cal, social, ethnic, religious, or national group is not meant to imply
that all members of that group are terrorists. Indeed, terrorists
represent a small minority of dedicated, often fanatical, individuals
in most such groups. It is that small group-and their ac-
tions-that is the subject of this report. 5
Although the disclaimer does not specify what group or groups
it is concerned about, it is not difficult to conclude that the refer-
ence is to Islamic fundamentalists and perhaps to Muslims more
broadly. Meretricious though it is, this disclaimer is belied by the
images in the text itself. The report, which purports to provide a
global picture of international terrorism in 1992, includes eight
photographs, three on the cover and five within the text.36 Of the
eight photographs, six depict persons or incidents related to Islamic
fundamentalism. Of these six, three depict men wearing turbans
and robes.
The image of terrorists as Arabic fanatics is ubiquitous in the
media. So ubiquitous is this image, that The New Yorker magazine,
in its July 26, 1993 issue, depicts on its cover four children playing
at the beach. In multicultural harmony, three children-one black,
one hispanic, one caucasian-build an elaborate sand castle (remi-
niscent of New York) from which two towers loom prominently. The
children gape in horror as a fourth child, wearing Arab headdress
and dark glasses, leaps onto the towers. The illustration carries the
caption "Castles in the Sand" in the credits.37 There is no mention
of terrorism in the magazine. The illustration needs, it seems, no
explanation-it stands alone.
The focus on terrorists wearing turbans or Arab headdress in
the popular press is evocative. The American public has been pre-
sented with image after image of the blind Sheik Omar Abdel
35. STATE DEP'T REPORT, supra note 4, at v.
36. Id. at 16.
37. David Mazzucchelli, Castles in the Sand, NEW YORKER, July 26, 1993, cover.
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Rahman.38 Although Rahman has, to date, not been accused of any
violent act-only of inciting others to violence or of condoning such
violence-he has become the familiar face of terrorism:
The striking thing about Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman as he was led
by guards into Federal court in Manhattan last week was not that
he seemed a strange and exotic figure in his clerical robes, dark
glasses and red and white turban. Rather, it was that he was en-
tirely familiar-the one of the fifteen defendants accused in a ter-
rorist conspiracy on American soil who was immediately recogniz-
able.39
It is his turbanned and robed blindness that is immediately famil-
iar. More recognizable than the other fourteen accused co-conspira-
tors because he is bedecked with the attributes of his frightening
"otherness"--the turban and the robe of the Islamic Jihad; the tur-
ban and the robe of the cruel Ottoman; the turban and the robe of
that other fanatic nemesis of the West-the Ayatholla Khomeini.
Sheik Rahman is frequently described as blind, self-exiled, 0 and
smiling.4' These are further attributes of his fanaticism. The blind-
ness of terrorist violence is visibly conveyed. Sheik Rahman's exile
is rendered suspicious. He was not forced out, but, we are told,
chose to leave. He is thus not a refugee, but a fugitive. The Sheik's
capacity to continue smiling, in the face of the horrors of which he
is accused, suggests that he is "crazy" and/or morally degenerate
and, therefore, dangerous.
C. The Terrorist as Nomad and
the Fear of Porous Borders
In describing and displaying these fanatical terrorists we slip,
not quite consciously, into familiar images that reinforce our sense
of endangerment. Thus, shortly after the World Trade Center bomb-
38. A striking example is in Time for the week of March 15, 1993, which car-
ried a photograph of the blind Sheik juxtaposed with that of David Koresh, leader of
the Branch Davidian "sect" besieged in Waco, Texas. At that time, the "blind Sheik"
had not been directly connected to the World Trade Center bombing. In the Name of
God: What Happens When Believers Embrace the Dark Side of Faith, TIME, Mar. 15,
1993, cover.
39. Richard Bernstein, American Law Tackles Terrorism, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 29,
1993, § 4, at 1.
40. Mary B.W. Tabor, Specter of Terror; U.S. Indicts Egyptian Cleric as Head of
Group Plotting "War of Urban Terrorism," N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1993, at Al.
41. The Sheik is often portrayed as "still" smiling. See, e.g., Behar, supra note
13, at 56 (photo of Sheik smiling); Why Not Just Deport Him?, TIME, July 5, 1993,
at 25 (showing photo accompanied by caption "The Sheik still smiles at a press con-
ference after arrest of followers").
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ing, Mohammed A. Salameh, "an illegal immigrant from Jordan,"42
was described in Time magazine as "a slight, dark-skinned man
about 5 ft. 8 in. tall, with close-cropped dark hair and beard,
dressed in sneakers and a light gray sweat suit that billowed
around him."43 It is hard to imagine what kind of sweat suit the
author is describing, until we realize that, when he uses the term
"billowing," the author has simply imagined Salameh to be wearing
traditional Arab robes-billowing in the wind. It is an image not of
Salameh, but from Lawrence of Arabia. Commenting on Salameh's
frequent changes of residence, and induced by the same familiar
exotic, an FBI investigator is quoted as saying: "One search is lead-
ing to another.... But these are nomadic people. While it may lie in
the culture, they bounce from place to place. All different people
sleep there, stay a short time, then leave."" The reference to no-
mads seems strangely appropriate. His constant moving is attribut-
ed not to his status as an illegal immigrant, trying to keep one step
ahead of the authorities, but to a cultural predisposition for shifti-
ness. Salameh (like all Arabs) is imagined as a nomad. He moves in
and out. Borders are permeable to nomads. Like terrorists, nomads
are migratory. They have no fixed abode. Familiar as dangerous
and destructive of stability and rationality, these nomadic people
threaten us with their potentiality for disruption.45
Western distrust of nomads has a long history. International
law has, in fact, from its inception been wary of nomads-it has not
known what to do about them. In discussing the European nations'
appropriation of the New World, Emmerich de Vattel, in 1758,
posed the question "[whether] a Nation may lawfully occupy any
part of the vast territory in which are to be found wandering tribes
whose small number cannot populate the whole country."46 He re-
sponded that
[the wandering tribes'] uncertain occupancy of these vast regions
cannot be held as a real and lawful taking of possession; and when
the Nations of Europe, which are too confined at home, come upon
42. George J. Church, A Case of Dumb Luck, TIME, Mar. 15, 1993, at 26.
43. Id. at 28 (emphasis added).
44. Ralph Blumenthal, Suspect in Trade Center Bombing Now Seen as Part of
Conspiracy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1993, at Al (emphasis added).
45. See GILLES DELEUZE & FELIX GUATrARI, THOUSAND PLATEAUX: CAPITALISM
AND SCHIZOPHRENIA 351-423 (Brian Massuni trans., 2d ed., Univ. of Minn. Press
1987) (1980), for a fascinating psychoanalytic discussion of nomads as the quintessen-
tial war-machine and their relationship to the state.
46. 3 EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATU-
RAL LAW § 209, at 85 (Charles G. Fenwick trans., Carnegie Inst. of Wash. 1916)
(1758) (emphasis added).
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lands which the savages have no special need of and are making no
present and continuous use of, they may lawfully take possession of
them and establish colonies in them."
And, we might add, delineate proper boundaries in them. Henry
Wheaton, writing in 1836, states that "[tihe peculiar subjects of
international law are Nations, and those political societies of men
called States. A State is 'also distinguishable f-om an unsettled
horde of wandering savages not yet formed into civil society."48 Re-
ferring to the European nations' colonization of the African conti-
nent, J.B. de Martens Ferrao, in 1890, states: "Natural rights are
born with man... blut international rights cannot be recognized
in those [savage] tribes, for want of the capacity for government....
Being nomads or nearly such, they have no international charac-
ter."49 In modern international law, the formal requirements for
statehood include a "permanent population," as well as a "defined
territory."0 Nevertheless, it has now been established that a sig-
nificant number of "permanent inhabitants" will suffice "even if
large numbers of nomads move in and out of the territory.""' Thus,
the presence of nomads will not make it impossible for an entity to
become an internationally recognized State, so long as there are at
least some settled, permanent inhabitants. Given the difficulties
international law has traditionally had with nomads, it is not sur-
prising that Palestinians function so satisfyingly and convincingly
as terrorists. Sharing in the nomadic quality the West ascribes to
all Arabs, Palestinians are also "stateless," and therefore outside of
the state system of international law-not recognizable by interna-
tional law. Stateless and nomadic, they are imagined as highly
mobile and invisible. Their mobility and invisibility, in turn, making
them effective terrorists.
47. Id.
48. HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 16-17 (Richard H.
Dana ed., 8th ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1866) (1836) (emphasis added).
49. JOHN WESTLAKE, CHAPTERS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
145-46 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1982) (1894) (quoting J.B. DE MARTENS FERRAO,
L'AFRIQuE: LA QUESTION SOULEVEE DERNIEREMENT ENTRE L'ANGLETERRE ET LE PORTU-
GAL CONSIDEREE DU POINT DE VUE DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 6 (Lisbonne 1890)).
50. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 201 (1986).
51. Id. § 201 cmt. c. For a modern day attempt by international law to "fit" no-
mads, who do not respect state boundaries, into the framework of international law,
see the Western Sahara, (advisory opinion) 1975 I.C.J. 12, 38-49 (Oct. 16).
52. "Whatever they do, we can expect terrorists to remain mobile, able to strike
targets throughout the world." Brian Jenkins, Terrorists at the Threshold, in LEGAL
AND OTHER ASPECTS OF TERRORISM 80 (E. Nobles Lowe & Harry D. Shangel eds.,
1979).
No. 1]
UTAH LAW REVIEW
Terrorists are usually imagined as coming in from the outside,
as being foreign" or foreign bred54-they are foreign, their tactics
are foreign, their ideology is foreign, or all three.55 Terrorists, like
nomads, make us worry about our boundaries. They make visible
our vulnerability to incursion. Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman is said to
have "slipped into the United States in 1990."56 "Borders are po-
rous; potential terrorists can slip in easily."57 "[Tihe porousness of
American borders appear[s] to pose extremely high obstacles to an
effective anti-terrorism effort. As in Europe, the [terrorist] groups in
the United States appear to be made up mostly of recent immi-
grants and a few naturalized American citizens bent on making the
country suffer...." 8 "It is a tale that highlights the startling ease
with which undocumented immigrants are able to enter New
York."59 The solution is that we have to police our borders better,
make our frontiers less porous, and keep "them" out.60 Not surpris-
ingly, shortly after the World Trade Center bombing, a bill seeking
to amend the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act was introduced
in Congress. The amendment's purpose was, inter alia, to
strengthen border security and defend against acts of international
terrorism.6
53. One British author's curious claim is that "[a]ssassination and terrorism are
foreign or Irish, both in popular belief and in practice. If we have a native main-
stream of violence it is in occasional rebellions." Hugh Fraser, The Tyranny of Ter-
rorism, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, supra note 3, at 29.
54. "[In recent years there has been an increase in this country of militant
groups who have adopted foreign-bred terrorist tactics as their method of focusing
attention on various political issues." Robert L. Rabe, Crisis Management of Terrorist
Incidents, in LEGAL AND OTHER ASPECTS OF TERRORISM, supra note 52, at 39.
55. An interesting recent example of the drive to externalise the "terrorist" was
given by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, following the Hebron Massacre. Refer-
ring to extremist Jewish settlers in the occupied territories he stated: "You are not
part of the community of Israel . . . You are a foreign implant. You are an errant
weed. Sensible Judaism spits you out. You placed yourself outside the wall of Jewish
law." Clyde Haberman, Rabin Urges the Palestinians to Put Aside Anger and Talk,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1994, at Al.
56. Alison Mitchell, Bombing Suspect Flown to U.S. After Egypt Puts Him on
Plane, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1993, at Al, B7.
57. George J. Church, The Terror Within, TIME, July 5, 1993, at 22, 27.
58. Bernstein, supra note 39, § 4, at 1.
59. Ralph Blumenthal, Fitting the Pieces of Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26,
1993, at Bi.
60. Germany's elite-and now controversial-counter-terrorist police squad, GSG-
9, is known in German as "Grenzshutzgruppe," which translates to "border protection
group." Stephen Kinzer, Police Scandal Is Giving Germans an Inside Look at War
Against Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1993, at Al.
61. S. 1351, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 701-704, 803, 805 (1993).
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D. The Terrorist as Outlaw
Terrorists, we are told repeatedly, do not respect the law. "Ter-
rorist do not play by the rules."' Now, this is hardly a surprising
proposition. Yet, it seems that the authors are claiming more, or
something different than the notion that terrorists, like criminals do
not respect the law. There is something special about the quality of
the terrorist's "not respecting the law" that we are expected to
grasp. The complaint is that the terrorist respects no law-not the
criminal law, not moral law, not the law of peace, and not the law of
war. The terrorist is understood to be flouting all of these sets of
law simultaneously. Such a complaint is surprising-if only because
it seems a logical impossibility. In our usual parlance, for instance,
war and peace are mutually exclusive. We are either in a regime of
peace, in which case we are held to the law of peace, or in a regime
of war, in which case we are held to the law of war. Further, it
seems that terrorists should either be thought of as acting within
the scope of the criminal law, in which case they might be accused
of violating criminal law, or they should be thought of as acting
within the scope of "war and peace," in which case they might be
accused of violating either the law of war or the law of peace. The
choice between these two conceptions is important because it is crit-
ical to a determination of the status of the terrorist.
Surprisingly, the complaint is often stated predominantly in the
form that terrorists do not respect the laws of war: "He has no mor-
al restraints in the choice of his objectives, as he has none in his
methods of warfare .... He respects no code of law which was ever
established for war or peace."' "War, even civil war, is predictable
in many ways. It occurs in the light of day and there is no mystery
about the identity of the participants. Even in civil war there are
certain rules, whereas the characteristic features of terrorism are
anonymity and the violation of established norms."'
The recognition of the potential existence of a state of war
requires recognition of at least two opposing factions-in interna-
tional law, two states-each capable of adopting a stance of war
against the other. By placing terrorists within the realm of "war or
peace," charging them with violating the accepted norms of "war
and peace," the authors appear to elevate them to the status of an
62. Jenkins, supra note 52, at 49.
63. Benjamin Netanyahu, Chairman's Opening Remarks, in INTERNATIONAL TER-
RORISM, supra note 3, at 5.
64. WALTER LAQUEuR, THE AGE OF TERRORISM 3 (1987).
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enemy state army; precisely the status they would claim for them-
selves. Two logical problems then arise. First, as mentioned above,
terrorists (equated with nomads) are often understood to be state-
less. Borders cannot contain them-and without borders, there is no
state. Second, if terrorists are to be held accountable to the law of
war, they must also be entitled to treatment in accordance with the
laws of war-such as international rules for the treatment of prison-
ers of war. This is precisely what a number of terrorist groups have
claimed-and the very thing that is consistently denied them be-
cause they are terrorists.85 Only legitimate combatants are entitled
to be treated in accordance with the laws of war, and terrorists, it is
emphatically repeated, are not legitimate combatants.66 Only by
holding firmly to such a position can it be maintained unambiguous-
ly and authoritatively that unlike war-for which there is a long
tradition of "just war" theories-terrorism can never be justified.
The paradoxical result is that terrorists are charged with being
violators of the laws of war and, yet, are treated as being outside of
the scope of the law of war since they can never be recognized as le-
gitimate combatants. One practical result is that, rather than treat-
ing captured terrorists as prisoners of war or as war criminals, ter-
rorists are usually treated as if they were common criminals-albeit
of a very bad and dangerous kind.67
65. Various "terrorist" groups have claimed the right to be accorded "prisoner of
war" status upon capture. They include the ANC in South Africa, see John D.
Battersby, 4 Rebels Accused in South Africa Refuse to Take Part in Their Trial, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 2, 1989, at 12, the Puerto Rican FALN in the U.S., see E.R. Shipp,
Puerto Rican Nationalists Guilty of Plotting Bombings in Chicago, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
6, 1985, at 16, the Red Army Faction (formerly the Baader-Meinhof Gang) in West
Germany, see Police Search For Terrorists, U.P.I., Feb. 2, 1985, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, UPI File, and perhaps most famously the IRA in Northern Ireland
and Britain, see Jury Rules on Maze Hunger Deaths, U.P.I., Dec. 1, 1981, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. Indeed, in 1987, U.S. President Ronald Reagan,
moved against ratifying part of a proposed major revision to the 1949 Geneva Con-
vention on the Treatment of Combatants and War Victims because of the fear that it
could be interpreted as support for the claims of 'terrorist" groups to be combatants
and prisoners of war. Reagan Said Against Ratifying Treaty on Treatment of Cap-
tives, REUTERS, Feb. 16, 1987, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
66. When British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher referred to the shooting of
the former governor of Gibraltar as part of the IRA's campaign of "guerrilla warfare,"
she was castigated by politicians and the media for her careless choice of words. In
referring to them as engaged in a campaign of "guerrilla warfare" she was thought
to have accorded the IRA a degree of legitimacy and violated the long standing Brit-
ish policy of denying the IRA's claim that they are engaged in armed struggle. Rich-
ard Ford, Dismay in Ulster at Ill-Chosen Words, THE TIMES (London), Sept. 20, 1990,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
67. Of course in some instances "terrorists" are held outside the law in a literal
sense. Such was the case, for instance, when Lebanese captives were held by Israel:
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The next striking thing about the above passages, is the
authors' apparent faith and reliance on the assumption that every-
one else observes the laws of war. Such an assumption in our day
and age seems at best naive. Laqueur's facile comment that "[wiar,
even civil war, is predictable in many ways... [and] occurs in the
light of day and there is no mystery about the identity of the partic-
ipants"6 8 seems to refer to a bygone and probably legendary age
when gentlemen warriors on horseback fought battles against one
another. It has, in any case, little relevance to the modern wartime
reality of satellite spying and stealth bombers. The problem, of
course, is that unless everyone else is taken to observe the laws of
war, the criticism of terrorists as norm violators ceases to carry
much force or conviction.
One effect of claiming that terrorists are not legitimate combat-
ants-that they are engaged not in war but in terrorism-is that it
liberates the state from having to itself abide by the laws of war in
its "war against terrorism." The strange claim that terrorists do not
abide by the law of war, provides additional ammunition to the
equally strange assertion that they do not deserve to be given the
benefit of law. Not only does this allow the state to ignore the law of
war in its dealing with terrorists, it morally relieves the state from
its duty to treat terrorists in accordance with normal rights and
entitlements recognized by municipal law or international law. By
placing himself voluntarily outside of the law, the terrorist loses his
claim on the law.
The starting point of terrorism literature is that terrorism is an
impermissible and abhorrent kind of violence-a violence qualita-
tively different from, and worse than, normal, everyday violence or
the perhaps equally familiar violence of war. Because the devastat-
ing effects of war can hardly be denied, the distinction cannot be
based on a comparison of the body counts of war and the body
counts of terrorism. As we have seen, one way in which terrorism
authors seek to distinguish the two is by focussing on rules. War,
they insist, is played'by the rules. Terrorism, on the other hand, is
played by no rules-not even the rules of war. The problem is that
terrorism, by definition, can never be played by the rules of war. If
it could, it would be war, not terrorism. At least, the authors seem
to imply, there are rules to war (even though they may sometimes
be violated), whereas there are no rules to terrorism at all. War is
"[Israel] calls them 'terrorists' but has neither put them on trial nor given them
rights as prisoners- of war." The Hostage Trade: Beware of the Dangers, THE ECONO-
MIST, Aug. 17, 1991, at 13.
68. LAQUEUR, supra note 64, at 3.
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ennobled by its amenability to rules. While we are familiar with the
concept of a "Law of War," we cannot imagine a "Law of Terrorism."
What would we mean by a violation of the Law of Terrorism? Ter-
rorism is by its very nature (and/or by definition) incapable of
rules.69 It is not amenable to rules. It is precisely the absence of
rules that defines Terrorism. This is its disruptive potential. This is
its destructive potential. The existence of terrorism is a challenge to
law. "Practically, [terrorism's] effect is to destroy the law itself-the
only thing which stands between humanity and a state of perma-
nent terror."" In combatting terrorism, the state is defending law;
saving humanity from lapsing back into a state of disorder-into its
primitive pre-law past. As we reflect on terrorism, we realize that
what is terrifying about terrorists is not that they are law violators,
but that they have situated themselves in that impossible place,
located somewhere outside of law.
Although the terrorist is imagined as having chosen self-exile,
outside the realm of law, he is also paradoxically the perfect subject
of international law. Numerous international conventions and reso-
lutions have been adopted condemning specific acts of terrorism.71
Like the pirate of yore, the terrorist is imagined to be the enemy of
all (civilized) mankind and therefore subject to capture by any state
and subject to every state's jurisdiction."
"Terrorists deserve no quarter. Terrorists should have no place
to hide. We must stamp out terrorist activity .... These people are
not worth the time of day .... They're not even people, doing what
they're doing."73
69. "[Tlerrorists . . . by their very nature ridicule the notion of law."
Netanyahu, supra note 32, at 48.
70. Hugh Frazer, The Tyranny of Terrorism, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, su-
pra note 3, at 23.
71. See, e.g., Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking
the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion That Are of International
Significance, Feb. 2, 1971, Organization of American States, art. 1, 27 U.S.T. 3957,
15 LL.M. 1384 (adopting general standards for punishment and prevention of terror-
ist acts); G.A. Res. 61, U.N. GAOR 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53, U.N. Doc. A/40/1003
(1985).
72. International law, historically, took extreme measures to combat piracy:
The judicial power of every State extends to the punishment of certain of-
fenses against the law of nations, among which is piracy.
Pirates being the common enemies of all mankind, and all nations
having an equal interest in their apprehension and punishment, they may
be lawfully captured on the high seas by the armed vessels of any particu-
lar State, and brought within its territorial jurisdiction, for trial in its tribu-
nals.
WHEATON, supra note 48, §§ 122, 124, at 192-93.
73. Bernard Gwertzman, U.S. Backs Raid, Regrets Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25,
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According to this perspective, the terrorist has chosen to be-
come an "other," to act as an "other." The state is therefore justified
in treating him as an "other." He is to blame. Counter-terrorism
measures are the result of his own actions. The state is blameless.
Indeed, at the very moment when the state is applying repressive
anti-terrorism measures, the state is imagined to be the innocent
victim of terrorism. The state is forced to act contrary to its own in-
clinations by the force and fundamental nature of the terrorist chal-
lenge. It is the stite which is thereby harmed-the state which is
being induced to commit suicide.74
The claim that terrorism causes authoritarianism-that it caus-
es democracies to commit suicide-is popular in terrorist
literature.75 Such a claim posits a direct cause-effect relationship,
one very different from the lesser claim that the emergence of a
terrorist group is often followed by the enactment of repressive
measures or by a military coup. The use of direct cause-effect
rhetoric has two interesting effects:.first, it has a tendency to ob-
scure that the direct victims of the repressive measures and/or of
the military dictatorship are the "terrorists"; second, and perhaps
most important, it leads us to by-pass any notion of state re-
sponsibility. It tends to make less visible the authoritarian streak
that seems to be latent within even the most democratic of demo-
cratic societies. Hence, the use of direct cause-effect rhetoric deflects
the question of how it is that democratic society after democratic
society has so easily fallen prey to these authoritarian strains. It
allows us to avoid having to explore the structure of our democratic
institutions to see how they might be flawed. It allows us to ignore
the contradictory tendencies of democratic ideals and authoritarian
urges that seem to be at the core of our societies, our institutions,
and our selves. "Increased surveillance and repression may become
an irresistible temptation to governments trying to protect their
own citizens against violence by a small minority."7'
Ironically then, the rhetorical transformation of terrorists into
frightening, alien outlaws leads inexorably towards a justification of
1985, at Al (citing George Shultz, U.S. Secretary of State).
74. "In short, the seventh, and deadliest, sin of terrorism is its attempt to in-
duce civilization to commit suicide." Paul Johnson, The Seven Deadly Sins of Terror-
ism, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, supra note 3, at 21.
75. "Such violent tactics ... often can cause democratic governments to over-
react by 'tightening security.' . . . The continued escalation of terrorism in Northern
Ireland forced the British Parliament to abolish the government of Northern Ireland
and to impose direct rule and iifiplement emergency powers." POLAND, supra note 22,
at 1-2 (emphasis added).
76. Jenkins, supra note 52, at 83.
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repression by the state, and to excuse authoritarian regimes. In
fact, repressive measures short of military dictatorship are virtually
recommended by the literature on terrorism, not only because the
terrorist has put himself voluntarily outside the protection of the
law, but because the failure to use all possible means to combat ter-
rorism is to put society at risk of falling either into chaos or mili-
tary dictatorship.
The effectiveness of the process of transformation of the terror-
ist into a terrifying "other," to whom all sorts of violence can legiti-
mately be done, can be gauged only by looking at examples of na-
tional anti-terrorist legislations, other legal counter-terrorism mea-
sures, and publicly accepted (or implicitly endorsed) extra-legal,
counter-terrorism measures. Such an examination is beyond the
scope of the present paper. It should be noted, however, that the
very application of such measures to combat terrorism assists the
transformational process-both in the public mind and in the mind
of those charged with carrying out the measures. The whole process
is, in other words, self-fulfilling prophecy. To be legitimately avail-
able to State violence is to be the very opposite of those of us to
whom the State owes a duty of protection. When violence is applied
by the State, the terrorist's "other" nature is reaffirmed and con-
firmed. The terrorist never seems so alien or different as at the
moment the violence is applied, and that violence is "legitimate."
IV. TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
A CONCLUSION
In thinking about, writing about, or reacting to terrorism and
terrorists, we seem to be inexorably drawn to the idea that they are
somehow always external to us-somehow always other. They are
different. Their difference is manifested as violence. We think of
them as boundary crossers-boundary violators. They cross interna-
tional boundaries. They are uncontainable. They violate the accept-
ed boundary between normal and extra-normal violence. They vio-
late the boundary between appropriate and inappropriate victims.
They cross the boundary between acceptable challenge to the sys-
tem and the unacceptable desire to annihilate it. They cross the
boundary between civilization and the barbarous primitive.
By deploying the kind of violence we name "terrorism," the
terrorist reveals himself to be other. It is the violence that identifies
the perpetrator as other. Once he is identified through his violence
as a terrorist, and hence as other, we proceed to hunt for further
evidence of otherness. Every indicia of "real" foreignness is then
welcomed because it reaffirms our belief that the terrorist really is
by definition other. He could not be one of us. The more we can
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identify the terrorist with our traditional enemy, the easier it be-
comes to explain the violence. We are not implicated in the violence,
but (of course) we have to respond.
It is because the terrorist is so unremittingly other-so suspi-
ciously foreign-that it seems appropriate that terrorism be treated
as a matter for international law. It is almost impossible to treat
terrorism as if it were a purely domestic matter." We cannot do-
mesticate terrorism precisely because we need to expel it-to put it
back outside where it belongs. The closer we come to admitting that
terrorism is an internal domestic problem, the harder it becomes to
make a clean break. No longer can we expel what we should never
have let in; rather, we will have to extirpate-cut out of our-
selves-that which we wish to remove, in order to be rid of it.
From the perspective of the western liberal democracies, it is
more acceptable to imagine the terrorist as being fundamentally
other, fundamentally alien. Not only does the otherness of the ter-
rorist serve to explain his "violence," but it is his "otherness," mani-
fested as violence, which calls forth the violence of the state. The
state is not doing violence to itself when it combats terrorism. In-
stead, it is doing violence to a foreign body which is seeking to de-
stroy the state from within. When it combats terrorism, the state is
doing what the state is supposed to do-protecting itself and its
citizens from invasion or destruction by- forces from without. We are
more comfortable with an image of removing a cancerous growth
than with an image of self-mutilation.
Placing terrorism as a subject of international law serves a
further function. From its earliest manifestations, international law
has been self-consciously a universalizing project. In the early days,
both peoples and states were understood as being subject to an un-
changing and unchangeable law of nature. By extension, all states
and peoples were therefore assumed to hold to broadly identical
standards and norms. International law, or the law of nations, was
viewed as nothing but the codification of the law of nature as it gov-
erned inter-sovereign relations. From that perspective, it was self-
evident that all states and peoples could be held to the same stan-
dards of conduct, since the law of nature was both universal and
knowable. Sovereign consent was relevant only to what might be
77. See, e.g., Douglas Jehl, Dispute Slows Bid to Track Fugitive, N.Y. TIMES,
July 23, 1993, at Al, concerning a dispute between the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tions and the State Department over which of these agencies should provide the
reward of two million dollars offered by the Government for information leading to
the capture of a missing suspect in the World Trade Center Bombing. Ultimately it
was resolved that the State Department was responsible for making the money avail-
able.
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thought of as second level rules.
Although international law no longer relies exclusively on a
universal law of nature to explain or justify its general applicability,
it is still very much concerned with setting universal standards
through, in particular, the mechanism of consensus. By framing
terrorism as an international rather than a domestic concern, west-
ern liberal democracies gain the advantage of establishing universal
opprobrium. If terrorism is recognized as an international offense,
then, in naming a particular violence terroristic, the labelling state
can claim to be making a universal rather than a particularistic
claim. The terrorist is thus not only other to the state, but to the
international collectivity. Indeed, the labelling state can then imag-
ine the terrorist to be outside of all legitimate boundaries-not just
outlaw, but international outlaw. By extension, the labelling state
can also label non-conforming states, which support the activity
labelled as terrorism, as deviant and illegitimate. Since there is
consensus, the norm is universal and failure to conform to a univer-
sal norm is a violation of the violator's own norm. The violating
state is thus outlaw unto itself.
In this, as in other respects, terrorism turns our categories
topsy turvy. Terrorists, whom we imagine as nomadic boundary
crossers, do not simply violate boundaries. Rather, terrorism serves
to define those boundaries. The boundaries, that is, are drawn in
relation to terrorism. We recognize where war ends and terrorism
begins only in relation to terrorism. Once we have recognized that
the terrorist defines the boundary, the boundary itself is brought
into question. Why this line and not some other? How do we distin-
gnish between us and them? The boundary shifts in the wake of
these nomads. We cannot hold on to it. Like the terrorists, it is
unstable and transient. Yet, we cannot accept a world without clear
boundaries, so we continuously redraw them, and place the nomads,
these terrorists, firmly outside that perimeter-in a place we cannot
really imagine or define-and we patrol that perimeter to make it
real.
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